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Article 8

Electricity: Notes on the Transition Phase
Albert A. Foer*

I. INTRODUCTION
By now we have had experience with numerous transitions from
regulation to competition, both at home and abroad. Although there is a
debate about how swiftly such transitions should occur, all agree that
there is located between the starting point of governmental Regulation
and the promised land of market-based Competition, a Transition Phase.
Electricity is-and may remain for quite a while-in a Transition Phase.
When deregulation is being considered, advocates and opponents
naturally cast their arguments in terms of the beginning and the end,
with relatively little attention to the middle. After all, until the public,
the industry, and relevant governments are sold on the end (or,
conversely, in not commencing the process of deregulation in the first
place), there is no point in even talking about the middle passage. If it
is Pike's Peak to which we are traveling, let's cast our eyes upon the
gold-bearing distant mountains and not the unbridged rivers that must
be crossed.
The Transitional Phase, however, is inevitable and enormously
important. What happens in the transition determines not only whether
there will be a promised land but, if so, the nature of its terrain.
Moreover, public policies that may be appropriate during one phase will
be inappropriate in another, and this can lead to fundamental errors
unless policy-makers carefully relate their policies to the phase. There
are strong reasons to doubt that this is being done consistently in the
deregulation of electricity.
The Transitional Phase is the most difficult to envision ex ante. The
status quo, the starting point, the regulated industry, has almost by
definition been around for a long time and has been thoroughly mapped
and critiqued. The promised land, though a figment of the future, can
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be easily visualized, because it reflects the competitive model,
something we are familiar with theoretically and (albeit in other
industries) empirically. But the Transition Phase is not easily modeled.
It is essentially chaotic, and it is singular. That is, no other industry has
moved from precisely the same starting point, and therefore the starting
assumptions are unique. As complexity theory tells us, prediction is
difficult because variations in the starting assumptions can lead to very
different paths as a process unwinds into the future.
II. THE PARADIGM OF REGULATION TO TRANSITION TO COMPETITION
Before we turn to the deregulation of electricity, let us go a bit further
in sketching out the general paradigm of Regulation to Transition to
Competition. 1
An industry is characterized as subject to intensive economic
Regulation, when important decisions relating to the industrial
organization of the industry are made by public officials. Typically, this
involves pricing, profits, entry and exit, and terms of doing business. In
electricity, all of these elements were (and to a large extent still are)
regulated by a mixture of federal, state, and even regional officials.
Typically, the regulated industry is to a significant extent
monopolistic in structure. In electricity, it was long believed that
generation, transmission, and distribution could most efficiently be
provided by a vertically integrated natural monopoly called a public
utility. This is not to say that there are no elements of competition, but
compared to the role of monopoly, competition is minimal. The vertical
structure raised classic problems of access to outsiders, a problem that
remains even after deregulation as long as some parts are natural
monopolies.
The culture of a regulated industry tends to reflect the monopolistic
nature. That is, on the business side the driving incentives relate to
reliability and predictability, rather than entrepreneurship, cost-cutting,
or low consumer prices.
Similarly, the regulators tend to be
paternalistic, feeling an obligation (re-enforced by legislation and
politics) to the industry's well-being, to assure the reliability and
predictability promised to consumers and shareholders.

1. One is tempted to call this paradigm electricity's answer to baseball's legendary double
play combination, "From Tinkers to Evers to Chance." Are baseball names prophetic? If you
merely Tinker with Regulation, you will not get to Competition. If you linger for Ever in
Transition, you will not get to Competition. And if you think that Chance will get you to
Competition, you have dropped the ball. With apologies to Mr. Justice Blackmun.
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Skip past the Transition Phase for a moment to the Competition
Phase. Here the emphasis is on the interplay of supply and demand,
rather than Regulation, to determine output and prices. Terms of trade
are to be determined by the competitive struggle of rivals to gain
competitive advantage. Conditions of entry and exit are set by
economic forces rather than by government decisions. The assumption
necessarily underlying this is that there will be a sufficient number of
competitors to have a workable form of competition.
Instead of economic Regulation by the government, there will be
antitrust regulation, which implies a lighter, less frequent and generally
post-hoc form of public intervention. (Economic Regulation tends to be
prophylactic whereas antitrust tends to be reactive.) The sovereign
government is replaced, for the most part, by the sovereign consumer.
The culture of Competition is entrepreneurial. Private decisionmakers must have a concern for reliability, because consumers will
respond to service quality as one dimension of the multi-component
value package they are evaluating when they choose among competing
marketers. But consumers will also focus on price, and so competing
providers will necessarily pay more attention to how they can reduce the
price of their offerings than was necessary under Regulation, where
regulated pricing aimed at being lower than monopoly pricing but high
enough so that returns would attract investors. Indeed, it is the promise
of lower prices that inspires the initial policy decision to enter upon a
course of deregulation. The entrepreneurial spirit has two other features
of note. First, it is inventive, creative, and mold-breaking, as it seeks to
build that famous better mousetrap that will lure new customers. At the
same time, however, it is bottom-line oriented. Because of shareholder
pressure, this usually means that management focuses on the
profitability of the next quarter rather than longer-range (whereas the
regulated monopoly could focus on the longer-range), and the result is
that costs must continually be monitored and clipped (whereas
according to a famous but not always true economic theorem, the
regulated monopoly often had an incentive to build costs into the rate
base as part of a strategy to increase returns to investors).
Thus, as we look at supply and demand, in the Competition Phase,
the supply component needs to be characterized by a different, more
entrepreneurial mentality than was present in the Regulation Phase. It is
similar on the demand side. Whereas consumers of a heavily regulated
service did not have to make choices, in the Competition Phase it is
necessary for them to evaluate competing offers and to select among
them. This means that they must spend time learning new vocabularies,
comparing offers, and dealing with multiple suppliers, compared to the
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one-stop shopping that was characteristic of Regulation. Consumers'
transaction costs go up and not all consumers are equally capable of
handling their new role.
The culture of regulators is also quite different under a regime of
economic regulation and a regime of antitrust. The economic regulator
focuses, as noted above, on making sure the regulated industry runs in
accordance with the public interest, as defined centrally by statutes and
regulations. The antitrust enforcer focuses, instead, on maintaining the
process of competition. The former is concerned with reliability, the
latter with prices, choice, innovation, and (above all) keeping decisionmaking decentralized.
III. TASKS OF THE TRANSITION PHASE

The Transition Phase, quite simply, has the mission of moving not
only the regulated industry, but also regulators and consumers from
Regulation to Competition.
The Transition Phase has received the most attention in terms of what
happened in Eastern and Central Europe after the fall of communism.
Nation after nation (often newly established as independent) opted to
move from socialist to free market. The mission was daunting and has
proceeded with dramatically varying degrees of success. Among the
tasks are the following:
* Dismantling of public monopolies through privatization,
* Creation of the basic institutions that are necessary to free
markets (including laws protecting private property, development
of capital markets, and emergence of independent judiciaries),
* Passage of competition policy laws, development of competition
policy agencies.
Great controversy surrounded each of these tasks because there were
so many different ways in which each could theoretically be directed.
Equally noteworthy was the controversy over the pace at which the
transition should be attempted and the priorities that should be assigned
to the various tasks and subtasks that would need to be accomplished.
One set of voices called for "the Big Bang" by which as much as
possible would be done more or less simultaneously and rapidly. The
Transition Phase, in this view, should be short and abrupt, taking
advantage of the popular support for radical change and avoiding a
prolonged period during which opposition would inevitably congeal.
The major competing camp called for a much slower, step-by-step pace,
on the recognition of the complexity of the transition and the fear that
the Big Bang would lead to the Big Collapse.
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The deregulation of electricity raises the same kinds of questions that
I will now pose as keys to the Transition Phase. Assuming a popular
objective, how can the incentives for integrated firms to discriminate
against their downstream generation competitors be eliminated or
sufficiently dampened? How will multiple competitors be brought into
existence? What functions can (generation), cannot (transmission), and
might (distribution) be deregulated? How will deregulated parts relate
to those that remain regulated? How will the management of the firms
that are deregulated become acculturated to competition? What role
will regulators play during the deregulating process? How should the
change from FERC oversight to antitrust oversight be made, in terms of
laws, in terms of budgets, in terms of who the decision-makers will be
and how they view the world? How will consumers be protected as
regulation diminishes? How will they be trained for their new role?
And, how rapidly should we try to do this?

IV.

ANTITRUST IN THE TRANSITION PHASE, BETTER TO BE CALLED
COMPETITION POLICY

Because the Competition Phase will be subject to antitrust rather than
governmental economic regulation, there is a tendency to believe that
antitrust will dominate the Transition Phase. I would propose that we
speak in terms of competition policy rather than antitrust, recognizing
that the Transition Phase must combine aspects of economic regulation
and antitrust. Placing too much faith in the ability of antitrust during
the Transition Phase is one of those misplacements of policy that can be
devastating to the process.
Antitrust generally serves the function of maintaining competition.
(Indeed, "Maintaining Competition" is the official name of the antitrust
mission at the FTC.) That is, antitrust enforcement (public or private)
can stop anticompetitive behavior in industries that are more or less
competitive. It can block two companies in a concentrated industry
from merging, thereby preserving the industry from further
concentration. Antitrust by itself has rarely been able to take a noncompetitive industry and make it competitive. A company can gain a
monopoly without violating antitrust laws. Even after it violates
antitrust laws, there is little likelihood that the government will break up
a company in order to bring to life a more competitive industry.
The central task of a Transition Phase, however, is not to maintain
competition (which had at most a minimal role during Regulation), but
to generate competition. This is a more positive mission that utilizes
principles common to antitrust, but it is a mission that might better be
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described as "industrial planning" or, to focus on the importance given
to the desired end result, "competition policy." Another way of stating
this is that, at least when you are starting with something other than a
theoretical state of nature, free markets are not natural. They come
embedded in institutions and those institutions must be visualized, then
created, then nurtured by governmental policies. The Transition Phase
should be seen as an evolving form of Regulation, Regulation to Create
Competition. There will likely be a continual and important role for
regulatory agencies like FERC through their authority to use generic
policy initiatives (e.g., rulemakings, notices of inquiry, etc.) to promote
the Transition to Competition and perhaps even to maintain
Competition once established.2
V. MERGERS AND THE TRANSITION PHASE

Regulated companies are well experienced in gaming the regulatory
system. As they look toward a future of deregulation, they react by
trying to figure out how they can stay in control of their environment.
One obvious way is to get ahead of the curve by consolidating with
similar companies who would otherwise be potential competitors in a
free post-deregulation market. 3 Many and large have been the public
utilities that were merged out of existence as the electricity deregulation
process geared up.
Here we have an excellent example of misplaced policy.
Competition policy, recognizing that a Transition Phase has to generate
new competitors, would place a temporary moratorium in concentrated
markets, or at least a heavy burden of demonstrated need, on
consolidation, so that there will be a workable number of competitors
when we arrive at the Competition Phase. Antitrust, however, would
treat merging utilities under its standard merger guidelines, focusing
primarily on whether the utilities currently overlap with each other.
Finding that they do not, there is usually insufficient reason to stop the
merger. Getting ahead of the game, the U.S. has approached electric
utility mergers as if we were already in the Competition Phase.
An issue that keeps arising in Congress is whether FERC or the
federal antitrust agencies (the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission) should oversee mergers. No

2. Or, as I have put it elsewhere, what is needed is a period of Shermanization before the
industry will be ready for Sherman. Albert A. Foer, Institutional Contexts of Market Power in the
Electricity Industry, ELECTRICITY J., May 1999, at 13-20.
3. Of course there are also more efficiency-oriented motivations to merge, such as to integrate
into upstream transmission/fuel supply or downstream product diversification.
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distinction is made between the Transition Phase and the Competition
Phase. During the Competition Phase, primary responsibility should
certainly rest with the antitrust agencies. But, in the Transition Phase
there are at least three reasons why FERC should continue to play a
primary role:
" FERC has a "public interest" responsibility that gives it the
potential for taking a more pro-active position than the antitrust
agencies in shaping an industry for competition.
" FERC has deep expertise in the highly complicated electricity
industry, not matched by the antitrust agencies. This expertise is
especially needed during the Transition Phase.
* The interplay of FERC and the antitrust agencies allows both
regulatory and antitrust concerns to contribute substantively to
decisions, at a time when neither one nor the other, but a
combination of the two, is needed.
VI. MARKET MONITORING AND THE TRANSITION PHASE

It has become clear that the deregulation of electricity is moving into
a part of the Transition Phase that emphasizes "market monitoring."
That is, many electricity markets are already relying on competition to
determine the behavior of firms, even though the institutions of
competition are far from in place. It is becoming recognized as
necessary to monitor electricity markets to see if they are in fact
operating competitively so that state and federal regulators can know
when (and perhaps how) to intervene when competition is failing to
achieve acceptable results. How and what types of market monitoring
best promote the development of competitive electricity markets is a
wide-open question.
In the context of planning a workshop on market monitoring, Dr.
Diana Moss, Senior Research Fellow of The American Antitrust
Institute and a former economist of FERC responsible for evaluating the
competitiveness of markets, has identified the following questions,
presented here as an indication of the complexity involved.4
A. What to Monitor and Who Should Do It
What criteria should be used to determine if market monitoring is
needed? Should criteria be based on market structure and/or market
design? How does the type of product and market geography influence
4. Dr. Diana Moss, Workshop on Electricity Market Monitoring, American Antitrust Institute
(Dec. 11, 2001), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent/i66.cfm.
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the need for monitoring? How does the presence of centralized or
decentralized market mechanisms affect the need for monitoring? Is
market-monitoring here to stay? Under what circumstances could
market monitoring be phased out? How can the objectives and
implementation of market monitoring best promote competitive market
development and outcomes? FERC recently announced that utilities in
Commission-approved RTOs will not be required to file for or renew
their authority to charge market-based rates. What does this policy
imply for who will assume the bulk of the monitoring responsibilities?
How will RTOs and FERC coordinate on monitoring issues and
compliance? Are there other entities that are likely candidates for
market monitors? How will FERC and the RTOs (or others) interact to
ensure that market monitoring is performed consistently and
effectively? FERC has established broad policy goals for implementing
market-monitoring programs. To what extent should FERC develop
specific criteria to ensure consistent standards and implementation? To
what extent should states develop monitoring programs for retail
electricity markets? What can we learn from the market surveillance
experience in the securities industry and other commodity markets?
B. Detection and Enforcement
What are the criteria for detecting deviations from firm conduct that
promotes competitive market outcomes? How have those criteria been
employed in current market monitoring programs? How do detection
criteria compare/contrast across RTO's? How tightly are monitoring
plans tied to market designs, and what are the advantages and
disadvantages of a system that does not employ standard criteria? Does
it make sense for FERC to develop standard detection criteria? What
analytical tools are employed in the process of monitoring markets?
Are behavioral market models useful in evaluating firm conduct in the
market monitoring context? What issues arise in an environment where
market structures and market designs change rapidly? What analytical
tools are useful in such an environment? What is FERC's likely role in
the coordination of broader-scale monitoring efforts? How will FERC,
the RTOs and other possible monitoring entities share monitoring
information and data? Are there any lessons to be learned from the
How do the antitrust
market monitoring experience to date?
enforcement agencies see their role in monitoring electricity markets?
Under what circumstances would antitrust enforcement agencies
independently pursue violations detected under market monitoring
programs?
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From this recitation of issues, it is apparent that the interplay of
antitrust and regulation, or rather what we can jointly speak of as
Competition Policy, is a highly complex enterprise that is not going to
be worked out quickly or easily. The context is not one of theoretical
constructs but of pragmatic considerations involving balancing, tradeoffs, and predictions that may have to be revisited with frequency.
VII.

INFORMATION AND THE TRANSITION PHASE

The kinds of information that are needed by regulators who monitor
markets or who must oversee a Transition Phase and periodically
evaluate markets to see if competition is working, may be different from
what is needed by antitrust enforcers in a Competition Phase, where the
purpose of information is largely to prosecute violations after the fact.
It is another misplacement of policy for the government to reduce the
information that is needed during a Transition Phase, as if we were
already in a Competition Phase. Yet this seems to be happening. For
example, the Energy Information Administration (of the Department of
Energy) and FERC have launched initiatives to no longer require the
disclosure of certain plant-level information that has been useful in
market monitoring.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Public policy toward the deregulation of electricity needs to take
recognition of the three-stage paradigm of Regulation to Transition to
Competition. Each stage is fundamentally different and requires
policies that are stage-appropriate. Failure to make these distinctions
can lead to catastrophic failure of the deregulation process. In the case
of electricity, catastrophic failure can be deadly to human beings and
devastating to the economy.

